The Laws in England governing Trials by Juries in the Criminal Courts

The Juries Act 1974, as amended, contains the principal statutory basis for how juries are formed, what they look like and how they work. Beyond this legislation, case law has developed in a number of ways in relation to juries. In case law, the following three principles set out the role and privileges of the jury:

  1. Juries are the arbiters of fact;
  2. Juries will give a verdict without the reasons for that verdict being made public (“the unreasoned verdict”);
  3. The discussions that take place between jurors in the jury-room are secret.

The power that the above gives to juries makes it imperative that juries are formed and operate fairly. Statute plays a role here, and case law has developed the following three rebuttable presumptions to govern the system:

  1. The presumption of the ideal juror;
  2. If rebutted, then the presumption that judicial redirection will correct impropriety;
  3. If rebutted, then the presumption that s16 discharges (s16 of the Juries Act 1974) will isolate and remove the impropriety.

If all three of these presumptions are rebutted, then the presiding judge has powers at common law to discharge the panel and order a retrial, with a new jury. Making use of s46 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the courts have allowed some cases to continue after discharge resulting in judge-only trials, as in the case of R v Guthrie (2011), in a bid to maintain efficiency. The European Convention court at Strasbourg has refused to admit applications questioning s46 on human rights grounds (Twomey and Cameron v UK (2013)).

It is essential that these presumptions work to produce sensible juries. This is because if impropriety slips by unnoticed during a trial, then the underlying principles of English law can make it difficult for the appeals process to work properly. These are, as mentioned above, the secrecy of jury-room deliberation, the unreasoned verdict, and the role of juries in determining legal fact. The key modern case in this area of law is R v Mirza (2004) in which the House of Lords confirmed and underlined its commitment to these principles.

The Secrecy of Jury-room Deliberation

Although the statutory prohibition on investigating the goings-on inside the jury-room, found in s8(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, does not apply to the trial court itself or to the Court of Appeal (see Mirza), the common law rule in Ellis v Deheer (1922) does apply: the court will never admit details of jury deliberations as evidence to challenge or support a verdict. After a verdict is reached, the secrecy of jury-room deliberations is sacrosanct. Mirza made important changes to this rule, however, and nowadays evidence of a failure to deliberate at all will defeat the veil of secrecy. In the past, if a jury reached its verdict by tossing a coin there was nothing that the appeals process could do, as in the case of Vaise v Delaval (1785); neither  could the appeals courts do anything if a jury decided a murder case by consulting the murder victim herself via Ouija Board so long as all jurors partook in this activity within the sanctity of the jury-room itself, as commented on in the case of R v Young (1995). The only reason that the murder conviction was quashed in Young was that the Ouija Board was used in a hotel room not in the jury-room, and not all members of the jury were present at the time. After Mirza in 2004, the position now is that deliberation is by definition considered, not random, and if there is evidence of no deliberation then there can be no secrecy to protect.

Hard evidence of extraneous evidence being used in the jury-room will also today allow appeal – as in R v Boseley (Paul) (2007), a rape trial in which five pairs of knickers were found in the jury-room bin after verdict. The jury had used these to conduct their own “scientific” experiments to see how easily they would tear.

However, in general, jury-room deliberation is beyond the gaze of the appeals process.

Mirza confirmed that there is no contradiction between the secrecy of jury-room deliberation and the Article 6 European Convention right to a fair trial. Strasbourg itself reached the same conclusion in Gregory v UK (1997).

The Unreasoned Verdict

The verdict of an English jury is purely a determination of guilt, or otherwise. Guilty, or Not Guilty – a verdict delivered by the foreman of the jury to the court. If guilty, then it will be the role of the judge to weigh up the law, the Defendant’s behaviour, and the sentencing guidelines, and he will give reasons for why the sentence he passes is what it is. But for the jury’s decision no reasons are given – the verdict is purely binary.

As with jury-room secrecy, unreasoned verdicts do not in themselves contradict Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as found by the European court in Saric v Denmark (1999). This position was confirmed recently in the most important European case on this area of law, Taxquet v Belgium (2010). Taxquet expects defendants to be able to understand a verdict (see Mark Coen’s excellent article, “With cat-like tread: Jury trial and the European Court of Human Rights” (2014)), but this need not be interpreted as requiring a reasoned verdict. The fact that the English courts ban extraneous evidence (and allow appeals for breaching this rule), means that the accused will have heard all the material the jury used to reach their verdict, and thus will be in a position to understand the basis of that verdict.

The Jury as Arbiter of Fact

Judges guide on the law, juries determine the facts. Appeals against conviction are based on errors of law in the original trial, procedural irregularities in the way the court or the jury behaved, or new evidence which has become available. Leave to appeal will not be granted simply because the Defendant disagrees with the verdict of the jury. The jury is the arbiter of fact in the trial court, and the Court of Appeal will not entertain a re-trial of those same facts. The jury holds enormous power in the determination of guilt and the scope for appeal, because the jury is the arbiter of fact in the case.

***

It is essential that the propriety of juries is effectively maintained and managed. Otherwise, improper juries may reach verdicts that cannot be challenged, or, at best, their verdicts may invite appeal. On the one hand, fairness is not served, and on the other, efficiency is not achieved. It is essential that juries are formed in the correct way at the beginning, and it is essential that juries can be managed to ensure fairness thereafter. Below I shall therefore consider the three presumptions governing juries referred to above.

The Presumption of the Ideal Juror

The ideal juror is described by Penny Darbyshire as “an intelligent but passive sponge who waits until the deliberation stage before reaching a verdict, diligently following the judge’s instructions without burden of prejudice or sympathy and mindless to the consequences of his decision”. This, I think in some ways, takes the concept a little far, but certainly juries must be absolutely fair and absolutely independent. Juries must be “as white as paper”, said Lord Mansfield in Mylock v Saladine in 1764. It is an article of faith in our society that the presumption of the ideal juror exists. It is essential that a jury begins its life in the best possible position to satisfy this presumption. The secrecy of jury-room deliberation, the unreasoned verdict, the power of juries in determining legal fact, as well as s18(1) of the 1974 Act (see below), make this need especially acute. There are several factors that may assist the creation of the presumption of the ideal juror before the trial even begins, including general rules on composition, random selection, the laws on actual and apparent bias, and the rights of challenge that aim to weed out improper jurors before they are even sworn.

GENERAL JURY COMPOSITION

Potential jurors are summonsed in writing under s2 of the 1974 Act from the local populace within a defined catchment area around a court. From those summonsed to court, 12 are drawn by ballot, and then (subject to any challenges) are sworn as jurors. Exceptionally, if there are insufficient jurors the presiding judge may exercise an ancient common law right, “praying a talesman”, given statutory footing in s6 of the 1974 Act, to press passers-by in the street for service without writing – a power most recently used at Salisbury Crown Court in R v White (Jordan) on 7 June 2016.

Generally, the current law on jury composition is that anyone is eligible to serve on a jury if he is on the electoral register, has attained 18 years and not yet attained 76 years, and has lived in the United Kingdom, Channel Islands, or the Isle of Man, for 5 years since attaining the age of 13 (ss1 and 3 of the Juries Act 1974 , as amended).

Prior to changes to the 1974 Act implemented under the 2003 Criminal Justice Act, there was a wide array of ineligible persons who could not sit on juries. These included judges, lawyers, and the police. The 2003 Act lifted these restrictions, replacing the category of “ineligibility” with a far narrower category of “disqualification”. The only disqualified persons are those mentally unfit (being those subject to the Mental Health Act 1983 or the Mental Capacity Act 2005) or those on bail or who have ever been convicted and sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment or longer, or those whom within the last 10 years have been sentenced to any term of imprisonment or suspended sentence or community order. Her Majesty’s Courts Service today automatically vets the criminal records of potential jurors.

The 2003 Act retains a category of “those incapable of acting effectively as a juror”, including those with insufficient command of the English language (s10 Juries Act 1974 as amended) and those incapable on account of physical disability (s9B Juries Act 1974, inserted by s41 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994), for example, profound deafness (see R v A Juror (Jeff McWhinney) (1999). This – aside from obvious reasons of accessing verbal testimony – is because third parties (such as sign-language interpreters) are not allowed in the jury-room during deliberation. The blind may, at the presiding judge’s discretion, serve. Interestingly, under s18(1) Juries Act 1974 no verdict will be quashed because a juror turns out subsequent to verdict to have been disqualified or incapable, and in R v Chapman and Lauday (1976) the Court of Appeal would not overturn a conviction even though one of the jurors turned out to be deaf.

RANDOM SELECTION

The summonsing process of jurors is random, and although this is not a statutory requirement it has become the method accepted both by policy and case law. Random selection was introduced in England and Wales after recommendations made in the Morris Report in 1965, and since 2001 the process has been computerised through the Jury Central Summoning Bureau.

Random selection is designed to ensure that every citizen has a stake in the criminal justice system, and that juries are formed as being representative of their local communities. This principle rests on the right of judgment by one’s peers set out in the Magna Carta of 1215. Before the 2003 Act, the random nature of jury composition was increasingly damaged by the law granting a right to be excused from jury service to a wide range of professionals. David Blunkett, a Minister of the Crown at the time, has written that it was felt that by allowing the middle classes excusal as of right, “juries were increasingly made up of people who were either retired or unemployed, and [the Government] needed to ensure that they represented a wider spread of our society”. Today, a person must serve if summonsed, although there continue to be grounds for deferral or excusal for “good reason” for all citizens, and most especially for fulltime servicemen (ss 9A(1), 9A(1A), 9(2), and 9(2A), of the 1974 Act, as amended).

Penny Darbyshire suggests that in any event random selection does not actually result in representativeness. She argues that using the electoral roll as the basis for jury summonsing disadvantages ethnic minorities who are less likely to be registered on the roll, either because they more often live in transient rental accommodation or for other reasons (Darbyshire, 2001). Both the Runciman Commission and the Auld Report (which Derbyshire contributed to) argue that there needs to be better representation of women, ethnic minorities, and the middle classes to ensure fairness. The assertions that these groups are underrepresented or that representativeness equates to fairness have, however, been robustly challenged by Cheryl Thomas and the Jury Diversity Research Project (2003-6) which “reveal[ed] that [these criticisms are] based on myth not reality” (Huxley-Binns et al, 2017). The Jury Diversity Research Project involved hundreds of juries and jurors across the country, with methodologies that allowed analysis on a localised basis – something that had never been possible before (Thomas, 2008). The results show that there is, in fact, equitable representation of women, ethnic minorities, and professionals on English juries when adjusted for local demographic conditions (Thomas and Balmer, 2007; and Thomas, 2010). In addition, the results suggest that greater representativeness does not result in greater fairness.

The widespread public support for the jury system – even among ethnic minority communities – also suggests there is no problem with apparent bias when it comes to jury representativeness (Thomas, 2008).

Random selection is a good way – both in practice and the public imagining – of creating an ideal jury in the first place.

The courts are unafraid to defend this position. Modern case law robustly defends the principle that there should be no judicial interference in the process of random selection subject to a nuance given to the service of Crown Prosecution Service lawyers (see below), and subject to discharging jurors on account of disqualification or incapacity or challenge. In R v Tarrant (1998) the Court of Appeal decided that even in cases with a risk of jury tampering, a prohibition on jurors from a particular postcode (where they might be subject to pressure from gangs, for example) represented too great an interference in the randomness principle. Similarly, judges will not require any particular jury composition, and will not require a racially-mixed jury. This was established in the appeals of R v Ford (Royston) (1989) and R v Smith (Lance Percival) (2003), both cases in which black defendants were convicted by all-white juries. The presumption of the ideal unbiased juror is not rebutted at law by race.

THE RULES AGAINST BIAS

It is a long-standing principle of English law that justice must be done and must “manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done” (R v Sussex Justices, ex p McCarthy (1924)). Neither real nor apparent bias is permissible, and the ideal juror must be ideal and be seen to be ideal. The first part of this equation is relatively easy to manage. Real bias includes direct financial or political interest in the outcome of a case (Dimes v Grand Junction Canal Proprietors (1852), and R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2) (1999)). Also, there would be actual bias if the victim of a crime sat on the jury to try the defendant in his own case. Juries are asked, collectively, before being sworn, if there is any reason any one of them should not sit in a particular case – if they know one of the parties, for example, or have any interests in the case. Any person who might prove actually biased will therefore not sit.

As mentioned above, a lack of racial diversity on a jury is not considered to infringe the rules against bias. In Smith (Lance Percival) the Court of Appeal rejected an argument that s1 of the Juries Act 1974 infringed the Article 6 Convention right to a fair trial – it had been argued that this was so on account of there being no provision to ensure a multi-racial jury.

A flurry of appeals against conviction resulted from the 2003 Act’s lifting of the ban on the police and lawyers sitting on juries, and the law has developed via these appeals. In R v Green and R v Williamson (2007) the House of Lords determined that Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) lawyers should not sit on juries in cases prosecuted by their own authority, since – as Lord Bingham expressed – “Parliament cannot have intended [this]”. This means that while CPS lawyers may sit as jurors, in practice the only cases in which they can serve are those few prosecuted by other authorities, such as the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. In the appeal of R v Abdroikov (2007) and the later Court of Appeal hearing of R v Hanif and Khan (No.2) (2014) it was determined that a policeman sitting on a jury does not – as a rule – undermine the impartiality of that jury and is permissible (Zander, 2007; Rackstraw, 2008; Spencer, 2012).

Lord Auld, defending the 2003 Act’s provision that the police and CPS may sit on juries, asserted that “the danger of a police officer or prosecutor being biased [is] no greater than others who are eligible for jury service”. The European Court of Human Rights further found in Pullar v UK (1996) that a juror who is an employee of a principal prosecution witness is not necessarily actually biased.

It is less than clear that the police, the CPS, or an employee-of-a-witness-in-the-trial sitting on a jury does not equate to apparent bias, however.

The current test for apparent bias was articulated Lord Hope in Porter v Magill (2001) as “whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility [of bias]”.

In relation to determining bias in jurymen who perhaps know or work for a witness, the test is as articulated in the first appeal hearing of R v Hanif and Khan (2008), namely:

  1. Would the fair-minded and informed observer consider that the partiality of the juror to the witness may have caused the jury to accept the evidence of that witness? and
  2. If so, would the fair-minded and informed observer consider that this may have affected the outcome of the trial?
  3. If yes to both, then the verdict is unfair by appearance.

The court at Strasbourg argued in Pullar v UK (1996) that subjective impartiality means that the well-informed observer would conclude no bias, and objective impartiality means that the sensible layman would conclude no bias. These two tests collectively represent fairly accurately English law as it was prior to 1993 when R v Gough (1993) stripped away reference to the objective layman and established the court’s perception (a well-informed observer) as the only test. The court in Re Medicaments (No. 2) (2001) and in Porter attempted to shift this back again in order to be more in line with Strasbourg jurisprudence with the introduction of the “fair-minded and informed observer”. However, Simon Atrill demonstrates in ‘Who is the fair-minded and informed observer? Bias after Magill’ (2003) that English jurisprudence has increasingly found the “informed observer” well-imbued with all the knowledge and experience of the court itself. This is not how the law was supposed to develop, and little in practice has changed since Gough. Strasbourg decided in Hanif and Khan v UK that a policeman on a jury when another policeman is a witness in the trial does equate to apparent bias, as might any policeman on a jury, but the English courts have proved unwilling to reassess their approach. To disregard Strasbourg is of course our national prerogative under s2 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

It has been suggested that black defendants elect for trial by jury more often than their white counterparts because “they regard magistrates’ courts as ‘police courts’”, whereas juries appear more impartial and independent (Ferguson, 2006). How far this trust can survive the police actually serving on juries remains to be seen. As a branch of the executive arm of government, to have the police serve as the determiners of legal fact for the judiciary muddies the waters of even our limited separation of powers, and in the absence of progress in the courts, perhaps this is an area of the law requiring statutory clarification.

THE RIGHTS OF CHALLENGE

The rights of challenge go some way to ensuring a jury begins its life as ideal as possible. Challenge to the Polls is a right to challenge individual jurors, and Challenge to the Array is a right to challenge the entire panel.

  • CHALLENGE TO THE POLLS FOR CAUSE: Both prosecution and defence have the statutory right to challenge for cause (i.e. for a specific reason), pursuant to s29 Juries Act 1825 and s12(1) Juries Act 1974 respectively. Cause can include the disbarring elements discussed earlier (disqualification and incapacity) as well as bias. It is difficult to ascertain causes for challenge, since no voir dire in the American style is permitted in which jurors would be questioned individually. Race is not a cause. Apparent bias resulting from negative media coverage is also, generally speaking, not a cause, as established in R v Kray (1969), confirmed in R v Abu Hamza (2006), and approved by Strasbourg in relation to Convention rights in Mustafa (Abu Hamza) v UK (No. 1) (2011).
  • CHALLENGE TO THE POLLS WITHOUT CAUSE: Only the prosecution today has the common law right to challenge without cause – to challenge a juror without having to give any reason for doing so. This is the prosecution’s right to require a juror to “Stand By for the Crown”. It may be used exceptionally in cases involving national security or terrorism, but only with the express permission of the Attorney General. Defence counsel’s right to challenge without cause (“peremptory challenge”) was abolished by s118(1) Criminal Justice Act 1988.
  • CHALLENGE TO THE ARRAY: Challenge to the Array is a largely redundant (though still extant) common law right of challenge, typically exercised in conjunction with s5 of the 1974 Act which allows inspection of the panel – that is, the list of names and addresses of jurors. It is deployed usually because of some suspected impropriety in the way the jury was convened in the first place. Today, most of this process is computerised, and so there is limited scope for impropriety. As established in Ford (Royston) (1989), racial composition is not grounds to challenge the array. In R v Webster (1993) (otherwise known as “The Romford Jury Case”) counsel for the defence challenged the array because 9 of the jurors came from Romford, whereas the defendant came from Battersea. A fresh jury was empanelled. I should underline the fact that this peculiar example (which perhaps conflicts with Tarrant) was in a Crown Court and sets no precedent at law.

Rights of challenge are limited in the way they can defend (or rather, create) the presumption of the ideal jury before the trial begins. The difficulty of ascertaining causes for challenge and the effects of the 1988 Act have rendered the power of challenge limited. It remains, nonetheless, a minor but important stage in the construction of the ideal jury.

The Presumption of the Effectiveness of Judicial Redirection

The ideal jury should be constructed before the trial begins. If this presumption is rebutted once the trial has begun, however, then there is the presumption that judicial redirection will correct any impropriety that arises during the trial. This has been found to be generally effective by the English courts. In R v Sander (2000), the English courts decided that a racist joke by a juror, followed by a denial of racism when questioned, was not sufficient to discharge the juror, and judicial direction was sufficient to restore order. In R v Gregory (1993) the English courts had come to the same determination, and when this case was taken to the European Court of Human Rights in 1997 the European court agreed. Sometimes, as in R v Momodou (2005), the Court of Appeal commented that judicial redirection may not be ideal, but may simply be the best option available to the judge – in which case, it will not be challenged.

The Section 16 Right of Discharge and the Presumption of the Isolation of Impropriety

If judicial redirection fails to correct impropriety during the trial then it falls to the judge’s s16 right to discharge up to three jurors to isolate and expunge the rot. If a juror is utterly improper it is s16 that allows further action to be taken. In R v Wicks (2007) for example, a juror was discharged when found repeatedly listening to her iPod and doodling through a murder trial. Relying on extraneous evidence, the appearance of actual bias, or the discovery of disqualification or incapacity, may all require discharge, as discussed by Nicola Haralambous in ‘Reviewing Jury Misconduct’ (2008). The importance of s16 was recognised by Lord Hobhouse in Mirza who said that it “protects the impartiality of the determination of guilt” because it enables the presumption of the ideal jury to be maintained for the remaining jurors into the deliberation stage. As part of the presumption that impropriety can be isolated and expunged, a 2004 Practice Direction emphasised “the need [for juror’s] to bring any concerns about fellow jurors to the attention of the judge [straight away]”. If concerns are raised early enough then even if judicial redirection will not suffice then at least a s16 discharge may save the trial. If there is a substantial delay, however, then the rot may fester and spread, and the only correct response left would be for the judge to discharge the entire jury as in R v Thakrar (2008).

Discharge of the Entire Jury

The last resort, discharge of the entire panel of jurors, is possible under the common law. In R v Pryce (Vicky) (2013), for example, an entire jury was discharged after failing to understand even the basic principles of their duties.

Conclusion

The above gives an outline of the laws governing juries in England. I hope that readers have found it an interesting overview.

I wish to finish by highlighting one of the more interesting effects of the jury system – the notion of “jury equity”. Jury equity is when acquittals occur even in spite of the law. In the Trial of Penn and Mead (1670) a jury refused to convict on the basis of what the jury considered to be an unjust religious law. In R v Ponting (1985) a jury allowed a legally impermissible defence of public interest to a disclosure of documents regarding the Falklands War. More recently in R v Gilderdale (2010) a jury refused to convict a mother for attempting to assist the suicide of her very ill daughter, and in Kingsnorth Six (2008) the jury allowed a defence of “lawful excuse” to a charge of criminal damage against environmental campaigners who had damaged a coal power station “in protection of the wider world”. These results are in spite of judicial direction.

Our juries are independent, and they are the arbiters of fact in any given case. In 1670, in Bushel’s Case, it was established that a jury cannot be punished for its verdict, and it cannot be forced to reach any particular verdict. The role of judges and the law is to ensure as far as possible the independence and fairness of juries, and this post has described some of the laws and principles that underlie that effort.

Bibliography

Table of Cases

The English Courts

Dimes v Grand Junction Canal Proprietors (1852) 3 HL Cas 759, (1852) 10 ER 301

Ellis v Deheer [1922] 2 KB 113

Mylock v Saladine (1764) 3 Burr 1564, 97 ER 983

Penn and Mead (1670) 6 State Tr 951

Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, [2002] 2 AC 357

Re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No.2) [2001] ICR 564

Vaise v Delaval (1785) 1 Term Rep 11, 99 ER 944

R v A Juror (Jeff McWhinney) (Woolwich Crown Court, 9 November 1999)

R v Abdroikov [2007] UKHL 37, [2007] 1 WLR 2679

R v Abu Hamza  [2006] EWCA Crim 2918, [2007] 3 All ER 451

R v Boseley (Paul) (Worcester Crown Court, 31 July 2007)

R v Boseley (Paul) (CA, 19 December 2007)

R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2) [2000] 1 AC 119, [1999] 1 All ER 577

R v Chapman and Lauday (1976) 63 Cr App R 75

R v Ford (Royston) [1989] 89 Cr App R 278

R v Gilderdale (Lewis Crown Court, 25 January 2010)

R v Gough [1993] 97 Cr App R 188

R v Green [2007] UKHL 37, [2007] 1 WLR 2679

R v Gregory [1993] Crim LR 623

R v Guthrie [2011] EWCA Crim 1338, [2011] All ER (D) 264 (May)

R v Hanif and Khan [2008] EWCA Crim 532, [2008] 2 Cr App R 13

R v Hanif and Khan (No.2) [2014] EWCA Crim 1678

R v Kray (1969) 53 Cr App Rep 412

R v Mirza [2004] UKHL 2, [2004] 1 AC 1118

R v Momodou [2005] EWCA Crim 177, [2005] 2 All ER 571

R v Ponting [1985] Crim LR 318

R v Pryce (Vicky) (Southwark Crown Court, 20 February 2013)

R v Sander [1997] Crim LR 751

R v Smith (Lance Percival) [2003] EWCA Crim 283, [2003] 1 WLR 2229

R v Sussex Justices, ex p McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256

R v Tarrant [1998] Crim LR 342, [1997] Lexis Citation 4777

R v Thakrar [2008] EWCA Crim 2359, [2009] Crim LR 357

R v Webster (The Old Bailey, 1993) (“The Romford Jury” case)

R v White (Jordan) (Salisbury Crown Court, 12 August 2016)

R v Wicks (Blackfriars Crown Court, 2007)

R v Williams and Others (Maidstone Crown Court, 10 September 2008) (“The Kingsnorth Six”)

R v Williamson [2007] UKHL 37, [2007] 1 WLR 2679

R v Young [1995] QB 324

The Strasbourg Court

Gregory v United Kingdom [1997] ECHR 22299/93

Guthrie v United Kingdom [2013] 22226/12

Hanif and Khan v United Kingdom [2011] ECHR 52999/08, [2012] Crim LR 295

Mustafa (Abu Hamza) v United Kingdom (No. 1) [2011] ECHR 31411/07

Pullar v United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 22399/93

Sander v United Kingdom [2001] ECHR 34129/96

Saric v Denmark [1999] ECHR 31913/96

Taxquet v Belgium [2010] ECHR 926/05

Twomey and Cameron v United Kingdom [2013] ECHR 67318/09)

Table of Legislation

Statute:

Contempt of Court Act 1981

Criminal Damage Act 1971

Criminal Justice Act 1988

Criminal Justice Act 2003

Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994

Human Rights Act 1998

Juries Act 1825 (6 Geo 4 ch 50)

Juries Act 1974

Mental Capacity Act 2005

Mental Health Act 1983

Statutory Instruments:

The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Commencement No.3 and Transitional Provisions) Order 2004, SI 2004/829

International Treaties:

European Convention on Human Rights (1950)

Table of Secondary Sources

Official Reports &c.

Attorney General’s Office, Jury Vetting: Right of Stand By Guidelines, (2012), <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/jury-vetting-right-of-stand-by-guidelines–2&gt; accessed 22 May 2018

Auld LJ, A Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales (London, September 2001) (“the Auld Report”)

Morris Lord of Borth-y-Gest, Report of the Departmental Committee on Jury Service (Cm 2627, 1965) (“the Morris Report”)

Runciman Viscount of Doxford, Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (Cm 2263, 1993) (“the Runciman Commission”)

Practice Direction (Crown Court: Guidance to Jurors), CACD 23 February 2004

Thomas C, Are Juries Fair?, (Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/10, 2010)

Thomas C, and Nigel Balmer, Diversity and Fairness in the Jury System, (Ministry of Justice Research Series 2/07, 2007)

Journal Articles

Atrill S, ‘Who is the fair-minded and informed observer? Bias after Magill’ (2003) 62 Camb Law J 279

Coen M, ‘With cat-like tread: Jury trial and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2014) 14(1) HRLR 107

Coen M, and Liz Heffernan, ‘Juror comprehension of expert evidence: A reform agenda’ [2010] Crim LR 195

Daly G, and Rosemary Pattenden, ‘Racial bias and the English criminal trial jury’ (2005) 64 Camb Law J 678

Darbyshire P, ‘The lamp that shows that freedom lives – is it worth the candle?’ [1991] Crim LR 740

Darbyshire P, ‘What can we learn from published jury research? Findings for the Criminal Courts Review 2001’ [2001] Crim LR 970

Ferguson PR, ‘The criminal jury in England and Scotland: The confidentiality principle and the investigation of impropriety (2006) 10(3) IJEP 180

Haralambous N, ‘Protecting the secrecy laws surrounding jury deliberations: The ongoing saga’ (2008) 172 JPN 97

Haralambous N, ‘Reviewing Jury Misconduct’ (2008) 172 JPN 592

McGowan L, ‘Trial by Jury: Still a Lamp in the Dark?’ (2005) 69 JCL 518

Olowofoyeku AA, ‘Bias and the informed observer: A call for a return to Gough’ (2009) 68 Camb Law J, 388

Rackstraw M, ‘In the balance’ (2008) 158 NLJ 726

Roberts P, ‘Does Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights Require Reasoned Verdicts in Criminal Trials?’ Human Rights Law Review (2011) 11(2) HRLR 213

Robertshaw P, ‘Responding to bias amongst jurors’ (2002) 66 JCL 84

Spencer JR, ‘Police Officers on Juries’ [2012] Camb Law J 254

Taylor N, and Roderick Denyer QC, ‘Judicial Management of Juror Impropriety’ (2014) 78 JCL 43

Thomas C, ‘Exposing the myths of jury service’ (2008) 6 Crim LR 415

Wolchover D, and Anthony Heaton-Armstrong, ‘Star Chamber or a Secret Gang of 12?’ (2009) 173 JPN 420

Zander M, ‘A touch of bias?’ (2007) 157 NLJ 1530

Books

Elliot M, and Jack Beatson, Beatson, Matthews and Elliott’s Administrative Law (OUP 2005)

Huxley-Binns R et al, Unlocking the English Legal System (Routledge 2017)

Online Articles

Blunkett D, “Doing jury service has made me realise how cynical lawyers have reduced court to an expensive, shambolic farce”, The Daily Mail, (London, 20 March 2011) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1388955/David-Blunkett-Jury-service-realise-cynical-lawyers-reduced-court-farce.html#ixzz5G4ZaH8HX&gt; accessed 22 May 2018

Rayner G, “Jury discharged in Vicky Pryce trial after failing to reach verdict”, The Telegraph, (London, 20 February 2013) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/liberaldemocrats/9883130/jury-discharged-in-vicky-pryce-trial-after-failing-to-reach-verdict.html&gt; accessed 22 May 2018

Other

Blunkett D, Speech to the University of Law, Bloomsbury Campus (London, 15 May 2018)

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s